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Faculty and Deans

The
Kahan Report

Justice Denied
by Linda A. Malone*
On September 28, 1982 the Israeli
Cabinet resolved to establish <;l
commission of inquiry pursuant to
Israel's Commission of Inquiry Law
of 1968, largely in response to the
largest protest demonstration ever
held in Israel 's history. The charge
to the commission was to examine
"all the facts and factors connected
with the atrOCity carried out by a unit
of the Lebanese Forces against the
civilian population in the Shatila and
Sabra camps ." The selected chairman of the commission was Yitzhak
Kahan, President of the Israeli
Supreme Court.
The Begin administration was
compelled , despite its obvious
reluctance, to estab lish the Commission in response to international
outrage over the massacres and
internal domestic protests against
Israeli in volvement , wh ich was
gradually revealed in the press after
initial denials by the Begin government of any involvement in the
massacres. By February 9, 1983,
when the Kahan Report was released, the massacres had already
been absorbed into the morass of
tragedies which had occurred and
still are occurring in Lebanon. But
with the issuance of the Report, the
controversy was rekindled on a new
level-focusing on the individual
responsibility of many high-ranking
Israeli officials , including former
Prime Minister Begin , then Minister
of Defense Sharon , and then
Foreign Minister Shamir. A brief
flurry of reprimands, to the extent
they can be nominated as such,

followed-a few military and military
intelligence personnel lost their
positions; Sharon, one of the most
harshly criticized individuals in the
Report, lost his portfolio. The Report
was heralded as a triumph of
democracy, a testing and reaffirma tion of the principles upon which
Israel was founded. The conscience
of a nation (or perhaps nationsincluding the United States) was
appeased.

A fundamental misconception of the Report Is
that It was a resolution of
national and Individual
/lability for the massacre
under principles of Inter·
national law and human
rights. It was not, nor did
It purport to be, such a
resolution.

Was there then justice tor the
Palestinians? Did the Report place
blame on the guilty parties, and
impose or demand punishment
appropriately? Without question,
from an international law perspective, the answer is no. A fundamental
misconception of the Report is that it
was a resolution of national and
individual liability for the massacre
'Lin da A. Malone is Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Arkansas.
c 1983 Linda Maione. Reprinted by
permission of the author.
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under prinCiples of international law
and human rights. It was not, nor did
it purport to be, such a resolution.
Before examining the responsibility
of Israel and its officials under
international law, it is necessary to
review briefly relevant portions of
the Report's analysis and conclu sions.
The Commission 's factual inquiries and conclusions relate only to
the events of September 16-18,
1982, not to the overall illegality of
the invasion or its aftermath. Also,
although the resolution authorizing
the Commission speaks of the
atrocities carried out by "a unit of the
Lebanese forces," that is, the
Phalangists, the Commission did
attempt to determine who in fact
carried out the massacres. And , as
is ord inarily the case with any
tribunal, the Commission attempted
to determine the facts, draw inferences from the facts, and ultimately
reach conclusions of responsibility.
For purposes of determining the
issues of responsib ility under
international law, it is not necessary
to scrutinize the facts and factual
inferences drawn by the Commis sion. It is not necessary to do so, for·
even assuming the correctness of
these factual assumptions, clear,
grave violations of international law
were committed by the investigated
Israeli officials. Briefly, however,
some mention must be made of the
more questionable factual assumptions.
(Continued)

Kahan ReportAlthough the link between the
Phalangists and Israel is frank ly
acknow le dged , Israel 's support.
indeed its creation of Major Haddad
as a military power in Lebanon , is
not ack nowledged except to the
extent that the Report notes Haddad
did not proceed north of the Awali
River " purs uant to IOF orders ."
Secondly, on September 16, the IOF
(that is the Israeli army) military
operational order number 6 was
issued , sta ting : "The refugee camps
are not to be entered. Searching and
mopping up the camps will be done
by the Phalangistl Lebanese army."

The entry of the Phalangists into
the camps was supposedly agreed
upon by Minister of Defense Sharon
and Chief of Staff Eitan in the
evening of September 14. The
Report ultimately concludes that
Prime Minister Begin knew nothing
of these decisions, although it
concedes that it is "ostensibly
puzzling " that the Defense Minister
did not inform the Prime Minister of
the Pha langists' entry into the
camps, and that Begin purportedly
knew nothing of the plan until a
Cabinet meeting at 7:30 p.m. on
Thursday, the 16th, at which he
raised no objection . Moreover, in his
deposition before the Commission ,
Chief of Staft Eitan stated that Begin

called him between 9:00 and 10:00
a.m. on Saturday to tell hi m of
American complaints about report
from the Gaza Hospital. Begin said
that he did not recall this conversa tion .
Yet the most implausible factual
determination in the Report is that
the IDF, including the Chief of Staff,
were unable to see or perceive
anything of what was going on in the
Shatila camp from the forward
command post on the roof of a five
(actually seven) story building 200
meters southwest of the camp, even
with the aid of binoculars. A Time
article (September 24) said that
journalists kept outside of the camp
could hear the one-sided gunfire.
The Chief of Staff himself acknowledged in a meeting the morning of
the 16th that the IDF had surrounded the camps. In Going All the
Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli
Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon, Jonathan Randal says, " In its
only obviously wrongheaded factual
error, the Kahan Report insisted
Israeli troops couldn't see into the
camp 's alleyways even with giant
telescopes on the command post
roof. Journalists who climbed the
seven-story building had no such
difficulty with their own naked-eyes."
This factual assumption is obviously
crucial because it refocused the
Commission 's inquiry into the
responsibility of personnel on the
scene from a question of their actual
knowledge to a question of what
they should have known.
Putting these questions aside, the
following facts are established in the
report:
1. An IDF order was issued on
September 16 prohibiting the IDF
from entering the camps with
"searching and mopping up to be
done by the Phalangists/Lebanese
army."
2. Chief of Staff Eitan and Minister of Defense Sharon agreed to
have the Phalangists enter the
camps on September 14.
3. On September 15, Chief of
Staff Eitan went to Phalangist
headquarters and told the Phalan-

Shatila Camp. September 20. 1982.

(Continued)
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Kahan Reportgist commanders that they were to
enter the camps and that a Phalangist liaison officer was to be located
at the Israeli's command post under
the command of Brigadier General
Yaron, another Israeli officer investigated by the Commission.
4. In the morning of Wednesday,
September 15, the Minister of
Defense, the Chief of Staff, the
Director of Military Intelligence, a
representative of Massad, Brigadier
General Yaron, and Major General
Drori met at the Israeli command
post for the Chief of Staff to report on
his arrangements with the Phalangists. During the meeting the
Defense Minister spoke twice to
Begin by phone. Immediately afterward the Defense Minister went to
the Phalangist headquarters with
the Director of Military Intelligence,
representatives of Mossad, and
others and informed the Phalangists
that they should maintain contact
with Major General Drori regarding
their modes of operation.
5. Later that day, Major General
Orori met with the Phalangists and
told them to enter the camps from
the direction of Shatila.
6. In a meeting the morning of
September 16, the first day of the
massacre, the Defense Minister and
Chief of Staff met. Eitan said the
camps were surrounded and the
Phalangists were to go in at
11 :00-12:00 p.m. The Minister of
Defense said he would send the
Phalangists into the camps. Sharon
spoke to Begin by phone, but
purportedly said nothing about entry
into the camps.
7. At 11 :00 a.m. on the 16th, the
Phalangist commanders met with
Major General Drori and it was
agreed they would enter the camps
and coordinate their action with
Brigadier General Yaron that afternoon. It was agreed that there would
be 150 Phalangists to enter from
south to north and from west to east.
It was also established that there
would be a Phalangist liaison officer
on the roof. General Yaron set up
lookout posts on the roof of the

forward command post and on a.
nearby roof "even though he knew it
was impossible to see very much of
what was going on in the camps
from these lookouts."
8. On September 16, the Defense
Minister issued a document on West
Beirut's entry to the Chief of Staff, his
deputy and the Director of Military
Intelligence saying "the IDF shall
command the forces in the area . For
the operation in the camps the
Phalangists should be sent in."
9. At approximately 6:00 p.m .,
Thursday, September 16, the Phalangists entered the camps.
10. The Report determined that it
was foreseeable that the entry of the
Phalangists into the camps was
likely to result in a massacre.
These are only the facts (as
accepted by the Commission) preceding the entry of the Ph alan gists
into the camps. They establish that
the Phalangists entered the camps
with the encouragement, cooperation, and assistance of the Israeli
officials, obviating for present
purposes any ~econdary inquiry into
whether the Israelis should have
known or did know later what was
going on in the camps. The Commission did find among other
subsequent events that the IDF
provided mortar and aircraft illumination for the Phalangists to oper9

ate, and that on Friday afternoon
Brigadier General Yaron, Major
General Drori and Chief of Staff
Eitan met with the Phalangist staff,
agreed to let them "continue action
mopping up ... " until 5:00 a.m.
Saturday, and agreed to provide the
Phalangists with a tractor "to
demolish illegal structures."
Given these facts from the Report
itself and limiting this 'analysis to
those facts preliminary to entry into
the camps, the next step is to
examine the determinations of
Israel's responsibility by the Commission compared with Israel's
responsibility under international
law. The Commission devised two
levels of responsibility-direct and
indirect. Its conception of the
differences between the two muted
Israel's responsibility. According to
the Commission, those directly
responsible were only those who
actually perpetrated or planned the
massacre itself. Accordingly, it
concluded that "the atrocities in the
refugee camps were perpetrated
by ... the Phalangists, and that absolutely no direct responsibility
devolves upon Israel or upon those
who acted in its behalf." In reaching
this conclusion the Commission
determined:
1. No other military force was
seen by witnesses in the area of the
(Continued)

Kahan Reportcamps or at the time of the entrance
into or exit from this area.
2. Major Haddad's forces were
not involved because: (a) there was
testimony that no unit of that force
had crossed the Awali that week: (b)
the relations between the Phalangists and Haddad's forces were
poor; (c) Haddad's arrival at the
airport on Friday was unrelated to
the massacres; and (d) some
members of the Phalangists had
Moslem names and southern Lebanese accents as reported by several
witnesses.
3. There was no reason to
conclude IOF soldiers were in the
camps based on a lost IOF dogtag
found in the camp and the place ment of cluster bombs (in themselves a violation of US/ Israeli
agreements yet used by the Israelis
in the invasion) as booby traps
under the bodies .
If, as the Report acknowledges,
the Israeli officials planned and
aided the Phalangists in the entry
into the camps, and the Israeli
officials knew or should have known
that a massacre was likely to result ,
then why wasn't Israel directly
responsible? According to the
Report, because the Israeli officials
did not allow the Phalangists to enter
with the intent that a massacre take
place or as part of a plan with the
Phalangists for a massacre to take
place. A recent book, The Battle of
Beirut by Michael Jansen, makes a
convincing argument that in fact
there was such a plan and intent.
Yet, whether the Israelis let in the
Phalangists when they knew or
should have known that a massacre
would result, or let them in pursuant
to a plan or with inte nt for a
massacre to take place, the result is
the same under international lawIsrael bears responsibility, without
direct or indirect distinctions.
The Report does conclude that
Israel was ind irectly responsible for
the massacres:
... The decision on the entry of the
Phalangists into the refugee ,camps

was taken without consideration of
the danger-which the makers and
executors of the decision were
obligated to foresee as probablethat the Phalangists would commit
massacres and pogroms against the
inhabitants of the camps, and without
an examination of the means for
preventing this danger. Similarly, it is
clear from the course of events that
when the reports began to arrive
about the actions of the Phalangists
In the camps, no proper heed was
taken of these reports, the correct
conclusions were not drawn from
them, and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the
Phalangists and put a stop to their
actions. This both reflects and
exhausts Israel's indirect responsibility for what occurred in the refugee
camps.

Whether the Israelis let In
the Pha/anglsts when they
knew or should have
known that a massacre
would result, or let them
In ... with Intent for a
massacre to take place,
the result Is the same
under IntematlonallawIsrael beaTS
responsibility . ..

Shortly before its decision on
Israel's indirect responsibility is the
only paragraph addressed to the
ramifications of the Report's conclusions under international law:
It is not our function as a commission of inquiry to lay a precise legal
foundation for such indirect responsibility. It may be that from a legal
perspective, the issue of responsibility is not unequivocal, in view of the
lack of clarity regarding the status of
the State of Israel and its forces in
Lebanese territory. If the territory of
West Beirut may be viewed at the time
of the events as occupied territoryand we do not determine that such
indeed is the case from a legal
perspective-then it is the duty of the
occupier, according to the rules of
usual and customary international
law, to do all it can to ensure the
public's well being and security.
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The principle of customary international law of belligerent occupa tion to which the Report refers is
also embodied in the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 relating to the
status of the civilian population in
areas under military occupation as a
result of war. Israel is a signatory to
the Convention, having ratified it in
1951 . Article 27 of the Convention
stipulates that the civilian population
must be protected, especially
against all acts of violence or threats
thereof. The "lack of clarity" referred
to in the Report as to Israel's
obligations as an occupying power,
is a lack of clarity in Israel's eyes
only. Israel has contended that it is
not an occupying power in Lebanon
as defined by international law on
the grounds that it has not established a military government in the
area it controlled and that its
presence was temporary. No international legal authority agrees with
its position, The United Nations, the
International Committee of the Red
Cross, the AdviSOry Committee on
Human Rights in Lebanon, other
respected internationa l law authorities, as well as the United States,
view Israel as a belligerent occu pant of Lebanon and therefore
bound by the international law of
occupation . Indeed, on July 13,
1983, Israel's own High Court of
Justice ruled in a case concerning
the status of detainees Israel holds
in Lebanon that the Geneva Conventions apply and that Israel is an
occupying power in Lebanon.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires the occupying power
to take all measures in its power to
restore and ensure as far as
possible, public order and safety.
More importantly, Article 29 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the party to the conflict,
here Israel, in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to
them by its "agents" without regard
to any individual agent's responsibility. The Phalangists entered the
camps at the instigation of Israeli
officials, with the ir encouragement
and support. Without Israel's ac(Continued)

Kahan Reportquiescence and support, the' Phalangists' entry into the Israelisurrounded camps would have
been impossible. The extent of
Israeli control of the Phalangists is
reflected in the testimony of Chief of
Staff Eitan that on September 15 he
"ordered the Phalangist commanders to effect a general mobilization
of a/l their forces, impose a general
curfew on all areas under their
control , and be ready to take part in
the fighting ." Regardless of whether
there was intent or a plan with the
Phalangists to effectuate a massacre, Israel is responsible for the
actions of the Phalangists acting as
their agents in the camp. Moreover,
if we assume, contrary to the finding
of the Report, that Haddad's forces
were also involved in the massacre,
their involvement would independently and unquestionably render
Israel liable for their actions in the
camp.
Thus far, this analysis has addressed only in part the responsibility of Israel as a state for the
massacres. For the nine individuals
subjected to inquiry by the commission-Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, Foreign
Minister Shamir, Chief of Staff Eitan,
Director of Military Intelligence
Saguy, the Head of Massad, Major
General Drori, Brigadier General
Varon, and Sharon'S aide Duda'itheir personal liability under international law for the massacres
would be determined primarily by
the Nuremberg Principles, affirmed
by the United Nations General
Assembly and acknowledged as
part of customary international law
by the Supreme Court of Israel in the
Eichmann case.
Article 6(a) defines "crime against
peace" to include "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the
foregoing ." Article 6(b) defines the
te~m "war crime" to include "murder

Sharon

Eitan

Ororl

Sharon. Eitan (I). Orori: " .. . the Phalang ists' entry into the camps and their 'mopping up'
were viewed as an integral and necessary part of the invasion . .. "

[and] ill treatment ... of civil ian
population of or in occupied territory
•.. not justified by military necessity" and Article 6(c) defines a
"crime against humanity " to include
"murder, extermination ... and other
inhumane acts committed against
any civilian population .... " The
same article provides that "leaders ,
organizers , instigators, and accom plices participating in the formula tion or execution of a common plan
or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for
11

all acts performed by any person s in
execution of such plan."
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon
was a clear -cut violation of custom ary international law. the UN Charter
and several resolutions against
aggression pursuant to the Charter
Begin himself has acknowledged
that the invasion was not a war of
self-defense As perpetrators of a
"crime against peace," the leaders .
organizers and others acting to
(Continued)

Kahan Reportformulate and execute the invasion
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution
of the invasion. From media reports
and the Kahan Report itself it is clear
that the Phalangists' entry into the
camps and their "mopping up" were
viewed as an integral and necessary part of the invasion of Lebanon
from its inception, for which the
involved Israeli officials are responsible under Article 6. Sharon insisted
the entry into the camps was
necessary to rid them of 2000
terrorists that never materialized.

As perpetrators of a "crime
against peace," the
leaders, organizers and
others acting to formulate
and execute the Invasion
are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons
In execution of the
Invasion.
Aside from their responsibility
predicated on the illegal invasion,
and with only the possible exception
of the head of Massad and Duda'i,
whom the Commission absolved ,
the other individuals by the Report's
own determinations would be responsible for war crimes or crimes
against humanity. Under customary
international law, . an official or
commander who "has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge,
through reports received by him or
through other means, that troops or
other persons subject to his control
are about to commit or have
committed a war crime and fails to
take the necessary and reasonable
steps to insure compliance with the
law of war, is responsible for such
crimes." The Kahan Report concluded preCisely that-that Begin,
Sharon, Shamir, Eitan, Saguy, Drori
and Yaron should have known of the
likelihood of a massacre, and either
failed 10 prevent the entry of the
Phalangisls into the camps and/ or
failed to take steps to restrain the
Phalangists once the massacres
had begun and information to that

effect was received.
Article 146 of the Geneva Convention also obligates the United
States to bring any party suspected
of a "grave breach" as defined in
Article 146 before an American
court for prosecution if the party
should enter the United States'
territory. Israel, therefore, is not
alone in failing to seek justice under
international law. Also, under com mon Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions it would appear the United
States has a responsibility to ensure
compliance with the Conventions by
contracting parties such as Israel.
There may be other bases for
responsibility of the United States
under international law by virtue of
its relationships with Israel. In The
Battle of Beirut, Jansen makes a
very convinCing argument for
Alexander Haig's advance know ledge and encouragement of Sha ron in the invasion. Former Presi dent Carter stated to the press that
he believed Washington had given
Israel approval for the invasion . The
deeper the extent of the United
States' acquiescence in the invasion and in Israel's unlawful use of
American weaponry, the greater the
potential for individual responsibility
for United States officials as accomplices in crimes against peace and
humanity, and war crimes.
This analysis has not addressed
the many other questions of responsibility under international law for
parties other than Israel and Israeli
officials because the Kahan Report
confines its inquiry in such a
manner. I have touched on a few
aspects of the United States'
involvement only as they might
relate to Israel's own involvement
but not, for example, in terms of the
United States' relationship with the
Phalangists or the Gemayel regime.
The Commission examined documents on this point, incorporated as
Appendix B to the Report, which was
not published "in the interest of
protecting [Israel's] security or
foreign relations." With this back ground, the Commission 's projections as to future issues of the
United States' involvement are
worth repeating:

It should ... be noted that in meetings with US representatives during
the critical days, Israel's spokesmen
repeatedly requested that the US use
its Influence to get the lebanese
army to fulfill the function of maintaining public peace and order in
West Beirut. but it does not seem that
these requests had any result. One
might also make charges concerning
the hasty evacuation of the multinational force by the countries whose
troops were in place until atter the
evacuation of the terrorists . We will
also not discuss the question of when
other elements besides Israeli elements first learned of the massacre,
and whether they did a/J they could to
stop it or at least to immediately bring
the reports in their possession to
Israel and other elements. (emphasis
added)

The Sunday Times of London
reported in January of this year
[1983] that US officials in Beirut
learned of the massacre only a few
hours after it was begun but did not
act rather than compromise their
intelligence sources.

The Inquiry was full of
sound and fury, but
ultimately, for the Palestinians and others
massacred, signifies
nothing.
The mechanisms for justice are in
place. Among other international
law principles, the Geneva Conven tions and the Nuremberg Principles
provide a widely accepted international framework for resolution of
responsibility and punishment for
the atrocities. The Kahan Report, n'
matter how well intentioned, failed t
result in any meaningful sanction
Begin, Sharon, and Shamir were all
criticized by the Commission-yet
Begin just recently retired; Shamir
became the new Prime Minister; and
Sharon remained in the Cabinet
(athough without his portfolio) . The
Report may have appeased many
consciences, but wrongly so-the
inquiry was full of sound and fury,
but ultimately, for the Palestinians
and others massacred, signifies
nothing . •

